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Deterrence or cooperation to reduce risks of nuclear war

Since the end of World War II, American presidents get enlightened about the unique security risks and challenges of nuclear war. The reality of nuclear terrorism, propagation, accident or war has resulted in continued efforts targeting the elimination, reduction, and control of nuclear risks (Arbatov, 168). To prevent nuclear war, proponents argue that nations should strengthen international cooperation. On the hand, critics suggest that nuclear war is avoidable by relying on the possibility of massive retaliation to deter countries from attacking each other using nuclear weapons. Cooperation has gained popularity with nations reducing nuclear weapons to support international agreements on non-proliferation.

The strengths for the desire for nuclear deterrence lie in the ideas of short, sharp shock; the use of disproportionate nuclear power could prevent future attacks. According to Siracusa (67), under the provisions of nuclear deterrence, a nation commits itself to respond to a nuclear attack in much greater force against the aggressor. The focus of massive retaliation is to prevent another state from initial attacks. The success of nuclear deterrence relies on the attacked nation providing information concerning the scale of its nuclear power to all possible aggressors. Through the disclosure of nuclear power information, a state announces its war policy thus making the possible aggressors aware of its maintenance of second-strike capability. Nuclear deterrence ensures that possible aggressors believe that the defending nation is willing to organize a reprisal attack, by using nuclear weapons on a bigger scale.

The strong point of nuclear deterrence is that it works on the same foundation as mutually assured destruction (MAD). These principles dictate that a nuclear nation can reprise a minor conventional attack from an aggressor by responding with all-out nuclear retribution. The primary application of the nuclear deterrence aims at preventing full-scale conflicts between different countries. Conducting a study on nuclear arms control, Arbatov (173) concluded that deterrence prevents nuclear war if the nations involved are not expected to withstand an all-out attack. Nuclear deterrence prevents countries from going into war because the credibility of an attack is critical to the prevention of attacks since war is expensive as it requires the construction of nuclear arsenals. Nations with limited nuclear weaponry avoid attacking those with full-strength nuclear arsenals because such a country will not adequately defend itself thus incurring massive losses.  

The weakness of nuclear deterrence involves altering the intentions of the opponents. A nation perpetrating an attack tends to assume that the opponents have the same thoughts and will react reasonably while retaliating. Gavin (27) asserts that based on the principles of responsibility it is implied that the state under attack possesses some of the fundamental human values of the aggressor. The aggressor tends to know the retaliatory power of the opposing nation; however, despite the suggestion of terrible retaliation the aggressor goes ahead to carry out the attack. For instance, Mao assumed that the Chinese population had a more significant population that would ensure it wins any nuclear war with a smaller country despite China having a poor nuclear infrastructure. Most of the nations do not abide by the doctrine of ‘just war' that assumes war is a platform for achieving a morally defensible goal.

Nuclear deterrence is only limited to deliberate and intentional attacks; for that reason, it is not useful against accidental use of nuclear weapon. The primary purpose...